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The problem here is not a university press per se NOT publishing one academic’s book, this 
happens to academics all the time -- books are constantly rejected on the basis of peer review, 
incompatibility with the mission of the press and so on. An abandonment after selection and 
contract would seem to indicate that a university press responded to undisclosed 
“stakeholder” concerns. This seems to fit a pattern that has overtaken the evolution of 
universities across Asia. Professionally, I advocate the role of historians in trying to explain 
the background of contemporary problems and that policies could be better informed if they 
are made with an understanding of the history behind them, and this is what I will try to 
encourage briefly here.  
Across the long history – and I look beyond the first university at Bologna to early 
proto-universities at Nalanda and Gundishapur as well, so thousands of years – universities 
were actually given to parochialism, the teaching of religion, the education of noble sons to 
do and think exactly as their fathers had done and their peers would do, the university was a 
place where thinking was structured according to what I call state-think-- I am here applying 
James Scott’s concept of state space to the patterns of thinking1  -- in a way that made thinking 
easy to conform to the state, to run the state, to lead the state. 2 
The unspoken part of this process was learning how to control, suppress, and exploit 
the vast majority of the population. Colonial authorities knew this when they introduced 
colonial universities in the decades up to and just after World War I. These were to teach the 
colonial mother tongue, European ideas and values, and both obedience and the figurative 
whip through the provision of certain kinds of knowledge and behaviour. Select Southeast 
Asian youth of means and merit, would walk in elite children and walk out colonial 
bureaucrats, military officers, and intermediary elites. They saw or were meant to see the 
world as sharply defined, hierarchically stacked ethnic minorities, right and wrong moral 
sexual behaviour, the legitimacy of the huge global and racial disparities in wealth and just 
why Southeast Asians on the whole deserved to be servants and peasants, and why the 
indigenous mode of thought was inherently inferior to the western mode of thought. 
But the 1920s and 1930s were when that beautiful moment happened, when 
Southeast Asians found in their education all the things the colonial state did not wish them 
 
1 James Scott discusses his ideas about state space in James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) and in idem, The Art of Not 
Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).  
2 I am using state-think here not to refer to ideology or political support for the state per se but the introduction 
or reinforcement of structures of thought that do limit thinking to certain avenues and blind the mind to 
alternative routes, drawing the intellectual inextricably into a particular intellectual framework in which the 
state’s ideas can make sense, ensuring that while the university product may support many different political 
choices in later life, alternatives that would fundamentally change the political order, do not even show up on 
the university graduate’s intellectual register. 
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to see, learned about revolutionary ideology, why the global disparity in wealth was a result 
of slavery and exploitation, and why their own modes of thought were not inferior.  
Universities in Southeast Asia continued to train the governing and commercial elites, but 
they also produced the revolutionaries and thinkers who would effectively lead their 
countries to victory in Burma, in Vietnam, Indonesia, and against absolute kingship in Thailand 
in 1932. 
Here I will make three, very specific points.  
 
1. Southeast Asian Universities have been designed for state-think 
 
First, Southeast Asian universities like universities in many former colonies have been 
designed to be places for state-think. Universities in the region were usually founded by 
colonial states or post-independence states, not to encourage free and critical thought, but 
to service the state and populate a gentleman’s club of bureaucrats, officers, and business 
leaders. 
The primary mission of these universities remains for them to be centres not of the 
development of critical thinking but merely places to teach their students what to think rather 
than how to think, to reinforce an imaginary in which certain political and economic elites are 
dominant as the only possible and acceptable world in which to live, and to supress any 
deviation from conformity.  
 
2. As a historical Phenomenon Southeast Asian Universities are Battlegrounds for 
contesting state-think 
 
My second point is this, Southeast Asians everywhere as students and academics have always 
struggled in universities to carve out spaces to challenge these efforts, to explore, 
experiment, to question. The “Southeast Asian” university if it is successful, not as a state 
project, but as a historical phenomenon, is a battleground where the state-think can be 
challenged and students whether they leave as conformists or revolutionaries have at least 
had the opportunity to question the order of things and change, even just a little, they come 
out better able to make their own choices as a result. 
This is the historically conditioned role of universities and this development is one of 
many features of the arrival at a free and open society. Yes, the attempt to impose state think 
in universities is true in these as well because it comes out of bureaucratic rationality not 
social morality.  So, I am not worried about states trying to determine what universities teach, 
again there are historical reasons why this EXPECTATION by governing elites is valid. 
 
3. Rising Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia today seeks to close the intellectual counter-
spaces produced by academics and students 
 
Third, while governments in democratic and democratic aspiring societies have one version 
of state think that can tolerate a fairly high level of contravention, authoritarian and military 
governments have less tolerance, none. The 1960s to 1980s saw many of these regimes, in 
some countries somewhat longer and then a return to earlier civilian governments and the 
universities returned to normalcy. The retreat of Democracy in the last half decade across the 
region, or the return to authoritarianism we have seen in Myanmar since 2017, however, has 
created the trend I am most worried about today.  
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What is working against the historical role of universities across Southeast Asia today 
is the increasingly effective closing up of what we can call the intellectual counter-spaces of 
both students and academics by the invisible hands we’ll call for the moment “stakeholders.”3 
This is the critical moment when universities go from saying this is what the state wishes to 
teach you to this is what the state limits your understanding to be. And they cancel the 
contract for a book that showed a different way to view one of the societies in the region. 
Worryingly, I think this is the trend, especially with the apparent success of many 
authoritarian states in controlling covid-19.  
What students and academics in universities globally need to do, not just in the West 
but in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere is to help students and academics in ASEAN 
universities defend their intellectual counter-spaces in their own universities through 
pressure such as the reviewing boycott launched by Pavin and by providing, even just virtually, 
intellectual lifelines that reach over the military picket and the invisible shields of the 
authoritarian-minded “stakeholders.”  
 
3 Observers often confuse as intellectual counter-spaces the many high-profile research centres that have 
popped up at well-founded universities in the region in the last thirty years. Some states are savvy that 
international reputations are not built like this so cloak the core of a university with high profile links with elite 
institutions elsewhere, by creating nominal centres for critical thought, often brining in internationally-famous 
academicians, but these appendages very soon succumb to the colonial mode of university education like the 
rest of the institution and the famous personages they import flee, if they can, to Oxford or Kyoto, but never to 
another Southeast Asian university ever again. This game is about pretending to encourage critical thinking only 
to win higher ratings on international university rankings.  
